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Introduction 
The European Union (EU), despite recent legal and institutional changes, has kept its 
hybrid nature. This is due to the fact that the European Union is a special kind of epistemic/ 
organizational/regulatory community “cursed” by hybridized relationship between actors 
and structures at transnational, supranational and intergovernmental levels, between 
external and internal dimensions of EU politics, between modern nation-state and 
postmodern cosmopolitan democracy, which “contaminate” the structures of power, 
authority, accountability and territoriality. 
Hybridness seemed to be the strength of the EU, giving her immunity from crises of 
identity and legitimacy, favoring changes and reforms, stimulating spillover of integration. 
The current crisis of the EU has reduced positive effects of hybridization and highlighted 
disadvantages and weaknesses with regard to the integration process. Nevertheless, hybrid 
features still prevail in an area of greatest sensitivity and importance for EU institutions as 
well as the Member States: that of security. EU security area is still divided into internal 
(Freedom, Security and Justice) and external (Common Security and Defence) fields; law 
enforcement, judicial and military cooperation; European security strategy and EU internal 
security strategy; the core and peripheria (opt-out countries); Schengen and non-Schengen 
countries. Despite numerous attempts at working out a comprehensive approach to EU 
security, differentiation and hybridness determine activities undertaken by EU institutions, 
agencies and Member States. 
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The European Union as an ever closer union of more integrated nation-states and 
societies has brought about important achievements: the Schengen area of free movement 
of persons, common asylum policy, cooperation in the field of migration and borders. All of 
them originated in a postomodern approach to territory and borders as state institutions. No 
control at internal borders within the Schengen zone, externalization of Justice and Home 
Affairs cooperation based on partnership and close links to neighbour countries, local border 
traffic agreements with non-EU states – these were clear examples of political 
deterritorialization of EU policy. 
Yet the European Union has failed to create secure and stable environment as 
transnational threats have been rising and the EU has been under constant pressure from 
transnational actors: terrorist groups, drug smugglers, traffickers in human beings, illegal 
migration networks. Hybridity of borders – as walls and points of access as well as gates of 
passage to the better world1 - was brutally tested during the 2011 “Arab spring” and a 
massive, though short-term, flow of North African refugees to the EU. Following the 
upheavals in North Africa and the Franco-Italian anti-Schengen dispute, The European 
Council in June 2011 adopted conclusions calling for an enhanced cooperation between 
border control agencies from the Member States, effective surveillance of the EU’s external 
borders and application of new technologies. Borders were to be transformed into security 
policy areas where high-tech tools, professional management skills and extensive normative 
measures should be strictly applied. 
The 2011 border crisis was a catalyst of reinforced control and more efficient 
management of external borders of the EU. However, trends towards the introduction of 
new measures, tools and mechanisms of protection, control and surveillance of borders 
were identified much earlier. Highlighting threats and risks coming from criminal activities 
developed by organized criminal groups, gangs and “mafias” was the traditional element of 
securitization of EU external borders. The need to introduce strict protection measures, 
develop and modernize technical and organizational means of control and surveillance was 
legitimized by preventive and protective role of state authorities (police, gendarmerie, 
border guards) against growing irregular migration as well as expansive criminal gangs. 
                                                          
1
 H. Cunningham, Nations Rebound?: Crossing Borders in a Gated Globe, Identities: Global Studies in Culture 
and Power, 2004, 11 (3), p. 333. 
 3 
The European Union since 2006 has been decisively pushing the Member States for 
introducing, developing and reinforcing elements of an integrated border management 
system, especially by implementing and enhancing high-tech devices and solutions typical 
for the concept of ‘smart borders’, or ‘e-borders’. The making of digital borders by the EU’s 
institutions and the member states reflected to some extent the logic of exclusion in the 
field of migration and asylum policies yet at the same time stemmed from the need of 
administrative efforts at securitization of the public sphere through digitalization of personal 
identity management.2 The historical evolution of the Schengen area has proved that 
compensatory measures were increasingly tied to technological solutions and electronic 
devices applied to strengthen protection and control of external borders.3  
This paper seeks to verify to what extent elements of ‘smart borders’ meet effectively 
expectations formulated by governments and citizens of EU Member States with regard to 
an effective protection of internal security and efficient management of external borders of 
the EU. Therefore, the model of an EU integrated border management will be analyzed in 
the context of “digitalization” and impact of  “smart” technologies. The Commission’s 
communication on “smart borders” of October 2011 will be assessed in the context of 
technology-driven systems of data collection, storage and comparison with regard to third-
country nationals coming to the EU. The thesis developed throughout this paper is that the 
concept of “smart borders” as part of EU integrated border management system falls within 
what Hooper defined as borderwork, i.e. a mechanism of physical and “virtual” (digital) 
differentiation leading to boundary maintenance and cleavage reinforcement. 
The paper is divided into three parts. The first part gives a picture of the European 
Union as “security enclave” possessing major features characteristic for “gated 
communities”. The next part provides a detailed evaluation of the EU’s integrated border 
management system. Final part contains an analysis of the latest communication from the 
European Commission on “smart borders”. 
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The European Union as a security enclave 
In 1995 seven of the EU Member States abolished their internal borders and allowed 
for a free movement of their citizens and legal third-country nationals across their 
territories. The emergence and subsequent extension of the so-called Schengen area was a 
great leap forward since persons staying within this area could travel freely without border 
controls, yet at the same moment the external borders were transformed into dense 
networks of surveillance and control taking advantage of new advanced technologies of 
personal identity management, early warning and threat prevention regarding cross-border 
human and material flows. 
At the time of emergence of the Schengen area transnational processes changed 
traditional perception and understanding of security. Globalization, deterritorialization and 
networking had a profound impact on European internal security. They allowed not only for 
circulation of ideas, international economic exchange, human mobility and development of 
interpersonal relations in the global scale, but also made room for proliferation of 
transborder threats, pathologies and various forms of criminal activities. Paradoxically 
enough, factors facilitating transnational cooperation, economic integration and free 
movement of people prompted the emergence of new policies and measures seeking to 
restrict liberties and strengthen the resilience for threats and hazards. Securitization of 
migration policies, restrictive asylum policy, strict EU visa regime and proactive border 
control and management gave altogether grounds for a new approach towards free 
movement of persons and flanking security measures. A shift from liberal stance to a more 
restrictive attitude towards EU citizens’ (personal data protection) and migrants’ rights, 
territorial dimension of security undertakings and massive impact of surveillance techniques 
and technologies made the Union resemble a “gated community” or “defended 
neighbourhood” underlying thus the “enclave-like” feature of the European Union in terms 
of global migration, cross-border flows and cultural shifts. 
In its “classical” meaning of the 1990s, the EU as a security enclave comprised a 
complex set of political activities undertaken by the member states, assisted by EU 
institutions, bodies and agencies, to secure high level of safety to EU citizens and legal aliens 
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as well as to respect civil liberties and fundamental rights. EU internal security governance 
was strongly influenced by “schengenization” of normative framework for internal security 
cooperation.4 The reinforcement of external borders, harmonization of methods, tools and 
procedures of border control, common visa policy and the fight against illegal migration and 
trafficking in human beings were glaring examples of protective measures adopted by the EU 
member states. In the face of new challenges and threats that emerged at the beginning of 
the present decade, those measures resulted to have limited efficiency and scope. Following 
the tragic events of the 9/11, the member states in cooperation with the Commission 
engaged themselves in the project of an integrated border management system consisting 
of multi-level coordinated mechanisms of protection and control of external frontiers of the 
EU. It was intended to demonstrate that the EU as security enclave had been constructed in 
a single territorial entity consisting of complex, multitiered, geographically overlapping 
structures embedded into multilayered security regimes.  
What is symptomatic for the EU as “protection space”5  is the stress on physical 
identification of persons crossing the external borders or residing on the territory of 
Member States, the technologically biased management of identity of third-country 
nationals through high-tech systems of border surveillance, perimeter control, automated 
targeting and risk-profiling.6 Application of protective devices, security technologies and 
remote sensor surveillance is aimed at establishment of “defensible space”.7 EU projects 
that have been unfolding recently (SIS II, VIS, Eurodac, entry/exit) are based on highly 
advanced communication and control technologies and resolutely introduced biometrics. 
This relatively new technique of personal identification and authentication is particularly 
important in the context of security management, allowing for advanced personalization of 
administrative measures concerning both EU citizens (ID cards, passports, mobile telephony) 
and aliens (visa, asylum application, border control). This is an effective tool against illegal 
migration (like Eurodac fingerprint data system), but also an instrument facilitating certain 
procedures related to freedom of movement (like IRIS system of control on selected British 
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 A. Gruszczak, Networked Security Governance: Reflections on the E.U.’s Counterterrorism Approach, Journal 
of Global Change and Governance, 2008, 1 (3), pp. 4-5. 
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airports).8 This is at the same time a powerful tool allowing for construction of a 
sophisticated system of individual control and surveillance in order to prevent and counter 
major threats to internal security like terrorism or WMD proliferation. Hitherto projects 
carried out by EU countries are concentrated on external border security measures, 
involving a specific “biopolitical technology”9 (biometric or machine-readable passports, 
biometric visas, fingerprint and body scanners) as well as high-tech means of border control 
(satellite surveillance, infrared monitoring, electronic fences and even spyplanes10).  
Even if technological advances could be translated into new methods and tools of 
securitization, cooperation of police and border guards is equally important. As Bigo and 
Carrera maintained, the “blinded belief in the use of technology as a way to solve political 
problems […] creates more problems and insecurity than it helps to tackle the initial problem 
itself”.11 The cooperation between law enforcement agencies, especially national police 
forces supported by Europol-coordinated information management units have to be coupled 
with high-tech surveillance and control facilities. Nodes of police cooperation, taking 
advantage of intelligence-led policing, electronic surveillance, biometric authentication, 
could best secure national security interests, international binding security arrangements 
and individual needs, constraining from an overwhelming impact on the public sphere and 
from permeating social interactions and individual behaviour. This is due to the fact that 
cooperation in the area of the EU’s internal security covers a vast terrain where multiple 
actors on transnational, national and sub-national levels enter in complex interactions 
mapping out or bringing about diverse models of security and agendas for public order.  
 The need to establish stronger and more politically-oriented bases for internal 
security policies as well as the pressure to set them into motion as quick as possible 
contributed to the employment of strategic thinking into conceptual works and policy-
making. In the aftermaths of the 2004 Madrid terrorist attack, unlike post-9/11 
developments, the need for concerted action was evident on the level of the European 
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Union. Moreover, given political and operational reasons as well as domestic circumstances 
in certain Member States, EU cooperation had to take into account common actions and 
strategies worked out by the institutions and bodies of the Union in its legal and institutional 
framework. The whole package of interlocking strategies of internal security management 
was based on the principles of diminishing threats (both internal and external) and reducing 
vulnerability. Some of those strategies have been outlined in general terms (the 2003 
European Security Strategy, the 2010 Internal Security Strategy); others were designed 
specifically to tackle the challenges of cooperation in the area of freedom, security and 
justice (the 2005 Strategy for the External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs; the 2004 
EU Drugs Strategy 2005-2012; the 2005 strategy for combating radicalization and 
recruitment into terrorism); still others kept a horizontal position (the 2005 Counter-
Terrorism Strategy).  
Nearly all of the above-mentioned strategies stemmed from an optimistic 
supposition that societal sphere of the EU is sufficiently strong to neutralize and absorb 
dysfunctional undertakings planned or committed by enemies of freedom and democracy 
through mechanisms of inclusiveness inherent in EU politics, deep-rooted in democratic and 
liberal tradition of an EU supranational community.12  However, it is often stressed that 
indigenous factors of instability and jeopardy are closely interlinked with external sources of 
threats and menaces, often strongly motivated by religious or cultural reasons. This is 
particularly important in the present era of asymmetric threats and conflicts where danger 
may come suddenly and provoke an immediate outburst of panic and destabilization. The 
2005 Strategy for the External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs was based on a thesis 
that the emergence and reinforcement of an area of freedom, security and justice in the EU 
can by successful only when the external political and social environment, particularly in 
adjacent and neighbouring areas and regions, will offer favourable conditions in terms of 
partnership, cooperation and threat reduction. Nonetheless, the EU should be more 
proactive in countering threats and challenges coming from outside, pursuing in close 
cooperation with third countries both actions to tackle irregular flows and cross-border 
crime and this should include efforts to strengthen border  controls, improve travel 
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 See C. Beyer, The European Union as a Security Policy Actor: The Case of Counterterrorism, European Foreign 
Affairs Review, 2008, 13 (3), pp. 302–03. 
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document security and combat people smuggling and trafficking.13 
The latest strategic blueprint put forward by the Council in February 2010 pointed 
out that internal security had to be understood as a wide and comprehensive concept which 
straddles multiple sectors in order to address major threats through an integrated action in 
the area of law enforcement and judicial cooperation, border management and civil 
protection. The Internal Security Strategy for the EU put a special emphasis on new 
technologies playing a key role in border management. According to the Council of the EU, 
technologies “may make it easier for citizens to cross quickly at external-border posts 
through automated systems, advance registration, frequent-traveller schemes, etc. They 
improve security by allowing for the necessary controls to be put in place so that borders are 
not crossed by people or goods which pose a risk to the Union.14 
The European Union as security enclave has been step by step heading towards 
“virtual fencing”15 being a networked structure of high-tech solutions and devices built at 
external borders, connected to external “posts” (consulates for instance) and backed by 
inner sophisticated data bases and search engines collecting, sharing and processing 
information concerning third-country “elements” flowing into the EU’s territory. Integrating 
those technologically-driven control and surveillance devices with strategy-oriented policy 
tools of border management quickly resulted a priority for the Member States as well as EU 
institutions and agencies in charge of internal security of the Union.  
 
EU Integrated Border Management - the state of play 
Migration has long been an important phenomenon for European societies, 
economies and – last but not least - identity. Regardless of massive internal migration flows 
in the aftermath of the EU’s “Eastern enlargement”, the immigration from third countries 
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2003, 28 (2), p. 92. 
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almost equaled the amount of intra-EU migration (in the period 2004-2008).16 According to 
Eurostat, as of 1 January 2009 there were 31.8 million foreigners living in the EU (6.4 per 
cent of the total population). Of these, 19.8 million are citizens of non-EU countries.17 The 
illegal foreign resident population in the EU is estimated at 1.9 to 3.8 million in 2008. (2007). 
Some sources claim the number of irregular migrants is 2.8-6 million or even up to 8 
million.18  Over half of illegal immigrants entered the EU legally but became illegal due to 
overstay.19 In 2010 540,000 illegal immigrants were apprehended in the EU but only 226 000 
(around 40 per cent) of these were effectively removed. 20 
The European Union, with 500 million inhabitants, over 42,000 km of coastline, 
almost 9,000 km of land borders and approximately 1800 border crossing points sees every 
year around 700  million external border crossings. About a third of these border crossings 
are made by third country nationals who are checked at the crossing points at EU external 
borders. It is forecasted that border crossings will continue to rise significantly, especially at 
airports. According to Eurocontrol (European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation) 
the number of border crossings at airports will increase from 400 million in 2009 to 720 
million in 2030. 
This handful of statistical data shows challenges and problems posed by the growing 
mobility of persons. It is obvious that the flow of people and goods involves a number of 
risks and threats to the security of people, territory and infrastructure on the territory of EU 
Member States. It has directly to do with the control and management of immigration as 
well as prevention and combating of threats to EU security. This double-edged policy is not 
easy to be carried out in an integrated form. However, an integrated border management is 
a kind of solution to that dilemma, trying to link positive, inclusionary elements of EU 
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immigration policy, with negative, exclusionary components of EU internal security strategy. 
An integrated border management system is therefore a prospective remedy to 
shortcomings and limitations to EU comprehensive approach to migration and border 
control. The border management system is the key control mechanism for overall migration 
management. According to the European Commission, “the concept of an integrated border 
management involves combining control mechanisms and the use of tools based on the 
flows of persons towards and into the EU. It involves measures taken at the consulates of 
Member States in third countries, measures in cooperation with neighbouring third 
countries, measures at the border itself, and measures taken within the Schengen area.”21 
An important and telling aspect of an integrated border management project for the 
EU was its technological bias and stress on data collection and processing, information 
exchange, knowledge management and even intelligence sharing. The concept of the EU’s 
integrated European Border Management Strategy, put forward under Finnish Presidency in 
200622 was strongly linked to modern technologies and IT systems. An automated border 
control was identified with electronic surveillance, biometric identifiers and data exchange 
systems. The “border package” presented by the Commission on 13 February 2008 
recommended establishing a new border surveillance system and setting up a new 
comprehensive framework for effective integrated border management (IBM) in the EU. This 
framework should include the four basic components: 
– border control (checks, detection, monitoring and surveillance) including the 
necessary risk analysis and criminal intelligence; 
– investigation of cross-border crime; 
– a four-tier access control model (measures in third countries, cooperation with 
neighbouring countries, control measures within the area of free movement); 
– cooperation between the authorities in the field of border management at the 
national and international level (border guards, customs and police authorities, 
security services and other relevant authorities); 
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– coordination and coherence of action taken by the Member States along with 
institutions and agencies of the European Union.23 
The institutional architecture of IBM combines existing EU border agencies with information 
systems and proposed control and surveillance solutions based on new technologies. The 
elements of this architecture are: 
– Frontex (EU Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States of the European Union), 
– RABITs (Rapid Border Intervention Teams), 
– EUROSUR (European Border Surveillance System), 
– Control and surveillance systems (entry/exit, Registered Traveller Programme, 
electronic travel authorisation,  Passenger Name Records), 
– Large-scale information systems (Schengen Information System, Visa Information 
System, Eurodac). 
Frontex was established by Council Regulation of 26 October 2004 with a view to 
improving the integrated management of the external borders of the EU’s Member States. 
Its main tasks include coordination of operational cooperation between Member States in 
the field of management of external borders; assistance to the Member States on training of 
border guards; risk analyses and technical expertise in the control and surveillance of 
external borders; support for the Member States in circumstances requiring technical and 
operational assistance at external borders; assistance to the Member States in organizing 
joint return operations; information exchange and cooperation with appropriate EU agencies 
and international organizations. 
Since the European Council in Brussels in October 2009 there has been a strong will 
among the Member States and a commitment on the part of the Commission to strengthen 
operational capabilities of Frontex and endow this agency with new tasks. The European 
Council called for the enhancement of Frontex and progress in its development on the basis 
of the preparation of common operational procedures for joint operations at sea, increased 
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operational cooperation between Frontex and countries of origin and transit of illegal 
migrants and prospective responsibility for and financing of joint return flights.24 These 
proposals were partly taken into account in a regulation of 25 October 2011 amending the 
2004 Frontex regulation.25 The Agency will evaluate, approve and coordinate proposals for 
joint operations and pilot projects made by Member States. It may itself initiate and carry 
out joint operations and pilot projects in cooperation with the Member States concerned 
and in agreement with the host Member States. It may also decide to put its technical 
equipment at the disposal of Member States participating in the joint operations or pilot 
projects. 
The new provisions allow for setting up European Border Guard Teams deployed 
during joint operations, pilot projects and rapid interventions. At the request of a Member 
State in urgent and exceptional cases related to high pressure at external borders of large 
numbers of third-country nationals trying to enter the territory of that Member State 
illegally, Frontex may deploy on the territory of the requesting Member State for a limited 
period one or more European Border Guard Teams. 
Frontex will also provide the necessary assistance, finance or co-finance from its 
budget, and at the request of the participating Member States ensure the coordination or 
the organization of joint return operations, including through the chartering of aircraft for 
the purpose of such operations. 
Rapid Border Intervention Teams  (RABITs) may be set up on the grounds of the 
provisions of Regulation 863/2007 of 11 July 2007. Any Member State faced with a situation 
of ‘urgent and exceptional pressure’ of migrants at its external border may submit a request 
to organise a RABIT. Every Member State should contribute to the so-called Rapid Pool 
placing at the common disposal an appropriate number of border guards  available for 
deployment at the request of Frontex. This agency would determine the composition of 
teams but the  the profiles and the overall number of border guards belonging in the Rapid 
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Pool should be decided by the Management Board. For now RABITS were set up only on few 
occasions mostly for joint border exercises and training. The only case for a “mature” rapid 
border intervention was the crisis at Greek-Turkish Border in late 2010. At the request of the 
Greek government, a RABIT was deployed in the Greek-Turkish border for the period of four 
months (November 2010 – March 2011). 175 guest officers from 26 Member States assisted 
their Greek colleagues in controlling the border areas as well as in identifying the 
apprehended irregular immigrants. 
EUROSUR (European Border Surveillance System) was outlined in the Communication 
from the Commission of 13 February 2008. The objective set in the proposal was the 
establishment of a single national coordination centre and a single national border 
surveillance system in each of the Member States located at the eastern land and the 
southern maritime external borders of the EU. It focused on enhancing border surveillance 
in order to reduce the number of illegal migrants, contribute to the prevention of cross-
border crime, provide the common technical framework for cooperation and 24-hour 
communication between the competent authorities of the Member States. Moreover 
EUROSUR should help the Member States achieve situational awareness at their external 
borders, meaning the capability to detect cross-border movements and find reasoned 
grounds for control measures, as well as enhance the reaction capability of their law 
enforcement services, conceived of as a lapse of time required to control any cross-border 
movement and means necessary to react adequately to unusual circumstances. Lastly, 
EUROSUR should assist the Member States in acquiring integration capability that should 
allow establishing an integrated network of reporting and surveillance systems on external 
land and sea borders. EUROSUR is still in its conceptual phase, it should  become operational 
in 2013. 
The entry/exit system is a system that should apply to third country nationals 
admitted for a short stay (up to 3 months). The system should include the recording of 
information on the time and place of entry, the length of stay authorised, and the 
transmission of automated alerts directly to the competent authorities in case of 
‘overstaying’. The general objectives of the entry/exit system are to reduce illegal 
immigration (especially overstayers), contribute to the fight against terrorism and serious 
crime and improve the effective management of economic migration. This system could 
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become operational by 2015, following an effective and complete rollout of the Visa 
Information System. 
The Registered Traveller Programme is a sort of an automated border control system 
enabling the automated verification of a traveller’s identity without the intervention of 
border guards. It is thus intended to facilitate the crossing of EU external borders for bona 
fide travellers, while ensuring overall coherence of EU border policy. This programme is  
addressed primarily to third-country nationals who could present  proof of sufficient means 
of subsistence, holding a biometric passport and – if necessary,  the visa valid for limited 
period. Among prospective users of this programme one can also see EU citizens crossing the 
external borders. 
The entry/exit system and Registered Traveller Programme could be combined as 
they are complementary, have impacts on the border checks at the external borders, and 
share a common approach to the practical border checks, information flows and 
management of resources. According to the Commission, ‘these systems will cancel out each 
others´ effects as to the management of border check personnel and the average time 
required for border crossings. 
Electronic System for Travel Authorisation (ESTA) is based on the assumption that a 
traveller wishing to enter a territory of any of the Member States would need to apply, via 
the internet, for an authorisation to travel based on common criteria. The Commission, in 
the 2011 Communication on smart borders, argued that the establishment of an EU ESTA for 
visa-exempted third-country nationals should be discarded as “the potential contribution to 
enhancing the security of the Member States would neither justify the collection of personal 
data at such a scale nor the financial cost and the impact on international relations.” 26 The 
Commission pointed out that any EU ESTA would not be an alternative for an entry/exit 
system as it could not be used to monitor current flows at border crossings. Moreover, the 
Commission emphasized the rationale for an RTP exempting in principle registered travellers  
from the ESTA requirement.  
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However, the US homeland security authorities, regularly contacting their European 
counterparts, have stressed the effectiveness of their ESTA and called for reconsidering the 
rationale for an EU travel authorization system. Recently, the US Attorney General, Eric 
Holder, and the Secretary for Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, attending the ministerial 
meeting of the G6 Group in Munich in May 2012 underlined that their Electronic System for 
Travel Authorisation had been a great success, enabling them to detect a number of 
potential terrorists seeking to travel to the United States.27 
The Passenger Name Record (PNR) is a set of personal data and technical information on 
individual and group travels. PNR data are contained in database records of computer 
reservation systems registering travel movements, usually flights, and include personal 
passenger data, information on travel agent, schedule and itinerary and other relevant 
information. In the context of border management and security governance, the collection 
and analysis of PNR data should help the law enforcement authorities to identify high risk 
persons and other threats to air traffic. The extensive use of PNR data was observed in the 
aftermath of the 9/11attack as part of US counterterrorism policy (Adam 2006). 
The European Union, initially hesitant to taking advantage of the PNR for 
counterterrorist purposes due to data protection standards, after the 2004 Madrid terror 
bombing subscribed to US position. In Declaration on combating terrorism, adopted by the 
European Council following the Madrid terrorist attack, the Commission was called upon to 
work out a proposal for a common EU approach to the use of PNR data for law enforcement 
purposes . The Commission was once more invited to bring forward such a proposal in the 
Hague Programme. Meanwhile agreements for the transmission of PNR data for travel by air 
were concluded between the EU and the United States, Canada and Australia. 
Several months after the conclusion of the EU–US PNR Agreement, the European 
Commission put forward a proposal for a framework decision on the use of PNR for law 
enforcement purposes in the EU (so-called EU PNR proposal). The objective set out in the 
proposal was to grant the competent authorities of the Member States access to PNR data 
of  passengers collected by air carriers in international flights. For the purpose of preventing 
and combating terrorist offences and organised crime, PNRs were subject to collection and 
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retention by state authorities and to transfer and exchange between them. Sensitivity of 
data protection issue, potential risks to civil liberties and concerns for potential 
infringements of EU data protection regime expressed by the European Parliament, the 
Fundamental Rights Agency, teh European Court of Justice, European Data Protection 
Supervisor and numerous NGOs have delayed legislative works on the framework decision 
on EU PNR.  
The above-described elements of EU integrated border management system have 
shown evidently the directions of rapid evolution and development of EU internal security 
policy in its territorial/physical dimension. The stress on physical identification of persons 
crossing the external borders or residing on the territory of Member States, the 
technologically biased management of identity of third-country nationals, and – last but not 
least – high-tech systems of border surveillance, perimeter control, automated targeting and 
risk-profiling reflects the commitment among EU institutions and agencies as well as the 
Member States to apply widely instruments of control and protection against potential risks 
and threats to EU internal security. In other words, IBM is unambiguously intended to 
securitize migrations and turn the external borders into automated gates. 
 
EU ‘smart borders’ concept 
 
A key element of digital borders is its interlocking into an integrated border 
management system. The European Union since 2006 has been decisively pushing the 
Member States for introducing and/or developing and reinforcing elements of such a 
system, especially implementing and enhancing ‘e-borders’ devices and solutions. The 2008 
“border package” put forward by the Commission contained numerous proposals aiming to 
apply as wide as possible modern tools of control and surveillance, among them systems of 
automated verification of a traveller’s identity and the recording of information on the 
length of authorized stay, and the transmission of automated alerts in case of overstaying. 
Due to certain political and human-rights reservation as well as technical and technological 
concerns, the implementation of the Commission’s package was prolonging slowly and in 
some areas was stalled. 
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The breaking point, at least from the political point of view, was the European 
summit in June 2011 where, after “an extensive debate”, the heads of states and 
government of EU Member States set orientations for the development of the EU's 
migration policy, the governance of the Schengen area and the control of external borders. 
The European Council decided that efforts should be taken to ensure that the external 
borders are effectively managed by “pushing forward rapidly with work on <<smart 
borders>>, to ensure that new technologies are harnessed to meet the challenges of border 
control. In particular, an entry/exit system and a registered travellers' programme should be 
introduced.”28 
The Commission, invited to present further ideas in that respect, issued in October 
2011 the Communication “Smart borders - options and the way ahead”.29 According to the 
Commission the “smart borders” initiative should improve the management and control of 
travel flows at the external borders by reinforcing checks while speeding up crossings for 
regular travellers. Because there is no detailed description of the exact elements, functions 
or modalities of the concept of smart borders as a technical project, one should see it as a 
political design galvanized by the crisis of the Schengen area and growing anti-immigrant 
attitudes in several Member States. 
The concept of smart borders has two components: an entry/exit system (EES) and a 
registered traveller programme (RTP). This means, paradoxically enough, that the 
Commission went back to its original 2008 proposal regardless of previous doubts 
concerning feasibility of linking those two components into a comprehensive technical and 
administrative arrangement. According to the Commission, an EES would allow the accurate 
and reliable calculation of authorized stay as well as the verification of the individual travel 
history for both visa holders and visa exempted travellers. It would do so by replacing the 
current system of stamping passports with an electronic registry of the dates and places of 
third country national admitted for short stays. A registered traveller programme is 
addressed to frequent travelers, especially to pre-vetted and prescreened third-country 
nationals. It should  facilitate border crossings for bona fide travellers at the Schengen 
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external border, reduce the time spent at the crossing points and facilitate cross-border 
contacts. As far as possible, both systems  would make use of new technologies such as 
Automated Border Control or Biometric Matching System for the purposes of visa policy. 
As to technical/administrative matters, the Commission observed that setting up a 
RTP effectively depends on setting up an EES. There are also significant financial benefits 
(savings) if the two systems are built simultaneously, using similar infrastructure at the 
central level. The Commission advocated the creation of a central database and suggested 
that this could be combined with a token system for registered travellers. Each individual 
token would contain a unique identifier which would provide access to the central database. 
The two systems should be interoperable and centralized in order to avoid replication of 
traveller’s data stored in a national system. These data should have at the beginning 
alphanumeric form and only at a later stage biometric data could be activated. However, the 
majority of the Member States, following discussion in the Council and at working groups, 
wished to introduce biometrics into the EES from the outset.30 The newly established 
European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of 
freedom, security and justice, which is due to start operations at the end of 2012, would be 
responsible for the development and operational management of the systems. 
Regarding practical implementation of both projects, the Commission set substantive 
and procedural principles to serve as a benchmark in this area. These principles include: (1) 
respect for fundamental rights, in particular the right to privacy and data protection; (2) 
necessity; (3) subsidiarity; (4) accurate risk management; (5) cost-effectiveness; (6) bottom-
up policy design; (7) clear allocation of responsibilities; (8) review and sunset clauses. Apart 
from fundamental rights, which in themselves present a politically and legally sensitive issue, 
the most relevant principle is necessity. It should not only legitimize in practical terms the 
project of smart borders but it also could deliver a rationale for further progress and 
development of the border management system in the EU. This is why the Commission 
clearly stated that – due to the lack of reliable information on overstayers from the Member 
States - it would be difficult to predict how many persons should actually be apprehended as 
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a result. The existing IT systems collecting information on third-country nationals, namely 
the SIS and VIS, should be of some assistance. To alleviate any allegations of inadequacy and 
arbitrariness, the Commission underlined that the entry/exit system should bring benefits 
not only for the Member States, but it should also modify the existing framework of the 
Partnership for Migration, Mobility and Security with certain neighbouring countries through 
a better and more accurate assessment of current visa policies and visa facilitation regarding 
respective third countries. 
While in the case of an EES the Commission highlighted the limits and possible 
shortcomings of this system on the basis of early assessment and evaluation of the existing 
prerequisites, a RTP was treated in a different, proactive manner. In the Commission’s view 
accurate risk management and pre-screening are critical features of the whole mechanism 
justifying the adequacy of technical solutions and total costs of the system.  
 
Conclusions 
EU border management is to a significant degree, at least in its ‘negative’ aspect of 
preventing illegal entry to the EU and expelling irregular migrants from the EU, a sheer 
example of mechanisms of selective differentiation driven by the logic of insecurity. Physical 
differentiation, taking the form of visa policy, passport controls, travelers registry, separate 
lanes in border crossing points and remote digital screening, is the dominant feature of what 
Hooper defined as borderwork.31 It is driven by the performance of specific power relations 
seeking to produce and reproduce a bounded identity. Borderwork thus depends largely on 
technical tools and their practical usefulness subject to technological advancement and 
quality of performance. In this respect biometrics emerged as a high-tech practical solution 
to the growing problem of management of identity of persons incoming to the EU.32 It is no 
wonder that the Member States are keen on introducing biometric identifiers and connect 
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them with a Biometric Matching System. Applied to asylum, immigration, visa and border 
control policies of the EU, biometric identification and authentication of foreigners became a 
powerful method of securitization policies. 
The project of EU smart borders is a typical example of “virtual fencing” which – as 
many examples in the past have proved – carries with itself numerous challenges, dilemmas 
and flaws. First, the concept of smart borders is exclusionary in a sense that it stems from a 
reactionary, defensive attitude towards “aliens”, often consists in identifying threats and 
risks and labeling it a security problem or dilemma which requires application of certain 
political, organizational and technical solutions in order to “maintain stability” or “protect 
public sphere”. It encompasses various roles performed by police, intelligence, border 
guards or visa administration, involving criminal profiling, surveillance of public space, 
detailed checks on border crossing points, monitoring of borders, prevention and countering 
cross-border organized crime, illegal migration, financial crime, the use of forged or false 
documents, or even visa blacklisting. 
Second, its feasibility is highly questionable given the number of persons crossing 
external borders of the EU, the amount of data for storing in databases, an average time 
needed to perform reliable verification of a foreigner’s identity, the reliability of tokens etc. 
Moreover, new systems (EES and RTP) have to be somehow connected to the existing (VIS) 
and in the making (SIS II) large IT systems collecting and storing centrally data referring to 
the crossing of external borders of the EU. In an opinion on the communication of the 
Commission on migration issued in July 2011 by the European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS) emphasis was placed on the need to assess the use of existing systems and to prove 
the necessity for an entry/exit system in particular.33 Actually, the Commission in the 
communication on smart borders acknowledged that “a fully operational and developed VIS 
is a prerequisite for the implementation of a Smart Borders system.” Hence, it seems that 
the smart borders concept for now has “overloaded” the existing institutional and technical 
architecture with respect to border management and information processing. 
Third, possible legal implications of “hits” in the system raise further doubts. Ben 
Hayes and Mathias Vermeulen, authors of an assessment of the costs of EU border 
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surveillance initiatives and its impact on fundamental rights argue that “An overstayers alert 
can only ever constitute a presumption of illegal residence, and stringent follow‐up controls 
with regard to the treatment of people identified as such will be needed to ensure that the 
EU respects its human rights obligations. An administrative procedure must be completed in 
order to determine whether the person has the right to stay legally in EU territory, and this 
procedure must give the traveler the chance to explain the circumstances of any overstay.”34  
Fourth, the project has a clearly preventive objective, aiming to detect, identify and 
quantify overstayers in the case of EES and support the efforts to prevent and combat illegal 
immigration and cross-border crime in the case of RTP. Given that, its preventive value will 
be still questionable with regard to illegal migration and people smuggling. It is indeed 
focused on legal migrants who prolong their stay in the EU yet this is only a part of the 
problem. One could even expect a temporary or long-term intensification of illegal crossings 
at external borders, especially done by organized criminal organizations dealing with 
trafficking in human beings. 
The project of smart borders does not respond clearly to the requirements of a 
comprehensive, integrated management at EU external borders. An “electronic fencing” 
system and IT solutions seem to be loosely connected to the institutional and operational 
framework of EU border policy. In terms of EU security strategy, its impact will be rather low 
if data flow is based on alphanumeric format and considerably higher if biometric identifiers 
are required. Smart borders as any mechanical tool for control and surveillance can 
contribute to risk analysis, threat assessment and situational awareness at EU external 
borders but hardly can be accepted as a system facilitating border crossings and enhancing 
cross-border cooperation with third countries.  
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